Showing posts with label ip. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ip. Show all posts

Monday, April 21, 2008

What is the Difference Between IPv4 and IPv6?

The IP protocol is a connectionless, unreliable protocol. TCP uses IP to establish sessions with remote computers and provides the reliability of the data transactions. IP, however, provides the hierarchical address space used by IPv4. Yet this address space is limited to fields in the IP datagram that are only 32 bits in length. When first created, it seemed like this address space would provide enough IP addresses to last for decades or more. After all, only government, educational facilities, and a few other institutions used what was then the ARPANET (the predecessor of the Internet). The address classes' original part of the IPv4 address space has pretty much been displaced by CIDR, to prevent wasting large ranges of addresses allocated to a single entity (such as class A networks).

IPv6 increases this 32-bit address space to 128 bits. At first glance, 32 bits versus 128 bits doesn't seem to be a big difference. When you consider the number of possible addresses that each of these bit ranges can provide, however, there is a tremendous difference. Fill a 32-bit field with all ones and you end up with a number just over 4 billion. A 128-bit field can provide a much larger number of possible addresses. The actual number of addresses, of course, depends on which bits are used to identify a network and which are used to identify a host on a network.

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The address space that IPv4 enables can give us enough addresses to satisfy the demand today, especially when using NAT for LANs and using CIDR to reclaim wasted address space that was created by the original address classes. Yet the world of electronics today has changed the playing field. It's not just computers that need an IP address. Handheld devices, mobile phones, and other consumerdevices will likely require an IP address in the near future. NAT might work well in a LAN or a small enterprise network, but when you consider that many wireless devices will roam from one provider to another, an assigned IP address becomes more important. NAT is performed at a local level, not a national or global one.

Expanding the IP address space is not the only feature that IPv6 gives to the Internet and your LAN or WAN. Other important features include the following:

  • A simpler header format for the IP datagram, which makes it possible to create faster routing techniques implemented in hardware designs.
  • Support for new extensions to the IP header, as well as a means to include future expansion for additional headers that may be created later.
  • The replacement of certain options left over from the IPv4 specification, as well as new options, and, again, room for expansion of additional options as required in the future.
  • The capability to specify which datagrams require special handling when it comes to flow control. This capability can enable real-time handling of a stream of IP datagrams (needed, for example, for real-time voice or video communication over an IP network), a feature usually accomplished by other protocols tunneling IP.
  • Authentication and encryption capabilities to provide for a secure connection.
  • As you can see, there are many differences between the capabilities of IPv4 and those of IPv6.

The IPv6 Headers

Headers are used by protocols to provide information about source and destination addresses, protocols, or the payload encapsulated by the datagram. It is typical that one protocol's packet is sent as the payload of another protocol. For example, the IP datagram is usually sent across most LANs encapsulated in an Ethernet frame. At the destination, the Ethernet portion of the frame is stripped off and the IP packet information is

revealed. The IP information is then removed by the protocol stack, and the TCP (or other protocol) information is then removed before the actual data is reassembled and sent to an application.

A few of the IPv4 fields were never put to any practical use. And some of those fields no longer existin the IPv6 header.

The fields for IPv6 are as listed here:

This section describes just the initial IPv6 header format. In the next section you will learn about ho IPv6 can include additional headers that extend the traditional header to provide information about additional services for the IP protocol.

Monday, April 7, 2008

Filtering on IP Addresses

To briefly review, the IP protocol is used by other higher-level protocols (such as TCP and UDP) to provide a connectionless best-effort data-delivery service. To do so, the IP datagram encapsulates the TCP or other protocol segment by adding source and destination addresses, port numbers, and other header information before sending the datagram farther down the protocol stack, where it is eventually transmitted on the wire bit-by-bit by the physical components of the network.

Routers can be configured easily to examine the contents of the IP header and drop packets that don't match a set of rules that the network or firewall administrator configures on the router. Perhaps the most obvious example is to filter out packets arriving from the Internet that have a source address that falls within the same network address range used on the internal network. Because such a packet, if it were indeed valid, would have to originate inside the network, it shouldn't be coming in from the outside! It is easy to forge IP packets so that the source address, as well as other header information, can be set to anything a hacker desires. A lot of programs are freely available on the Internet to do this.

When a packet with a source address is sent into your network, it's more likely that the destination server or workstation in your network will accept it as a valid packet, thinking it's coming from a user on the local network, and the packet will be processed as usual. Using this method, it's easy to get packets into your network and actually have them delivered, when they should not be.

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This is only one example of a good reason to filter packets based on the IP addressing information in the packet header. Because addresses can be forged, and because it's not practical to list all the millions of addresses that are allocated to computers on the Internet and pick and choose, you need to be cautious when using this kind of specific filtering. For example, suppose your network becomes the subject of a denial-of-service attack. You can use a network analyzer to discover the source addresses of the packets, and quickly insert a rule in the router (or firewall product) database that drops all packets that come from the network from which those packets are coming.

Filtering Based on Protocols

In the IP packet, a field is used to indicate the type of protocol the packet is carrying data for. For example, if the IP packet is carrying TCP data, the protocol field in the IP head& is 6. If it's carrying an ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) message, the protocol number is 1. The capability to filter out certain protocols is useful because many of the protocols in use on the Internet were created many years ago when security was not as much of an issue as it is in today's commercial Internet.

Take ICMP, for example. The Ping utility makes use of ICMP packets to determine whether another host is reachable. An ICMP ECHO REQUEST packet is sent to the address of the host computer in question. If it receives the packet, the destination computer sends back an ICMP ECHO REPLY packet. Sounds simple and safe, doesn't it? Well, it is simple, but not necessarily safe. Inside your network, Ping can be a useful tool for quickly determining that somewhere along the network path something is wrong and a computer is not reachable, whether the destination you are pinging is inside your network or on the Internet.

However, just as you wouldn't give out your credit-card number to a stranger, it's not a good idea to give out any information about your network, especially the addresses of the computers on the network, to an outsider. And, that's exactly what the ping command can do. It's easy to write a program that sits back and cycles through a range of IP addresses, sending out ICMP ECHO REQUEST packets and looking to see what replies come back. This saves a malicious hacker time because he now knows that an IP address is in use and can proceed to further try to intrude and compromise the system. Because automated tools are available for continuing the hacker's probe, it's imperative that you keep your network address information secret.

If you've ever received those boring telemarketing calls during the early evening hours, you can understand how this works. The telemarketers just cycle through phone numbers until they get someone to pick up the phone and answer. Allowing ICMP ECHO REPLY packets to respond to requests from outside your network is the equivalent of picking up the phone. Although you can hang up on a telemarketing call, after a hacker has your network address, she can always try back later when you're not around and use a wile variety of tools to probe your system to determine what is needed to get inside.

For this reason, it's usually a good idea to block incoming ICMP ECHO REQUEST packets. You probably don't want to block outgoing packets of the same sort, because they serve a useful purpose. You can allow users inside your network to Ping other servers on the Internet. For example, suppose you want to place an order with a business that has a website, yet it doesn't pop up in your browser when you try to get to its home page. You can use Ping to determine whether the business's computer is on the Net and functioning, and then from there start your troubleshooting efforts to find out why you can't bring up the business's Web page. If you Ping the site and get no response, you can be sure that either it's down or somewhere along the network path a router or another device is not letting traffic get through.

The same goes for you if you offer a service on the Internet. However, in such a case, you should make sure that your Web servers are highly secured and located on a network segment that can limit the damage should these servers be compromised. This network segment is called a demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Another utility that uses ICMP is Tracert. This command probes the network path and returns a list of all the routers and other intermediary devices it passes through to get to a destination address. Again, this is a useful tool when used properly, but you should block this sort of packet at your firewall. Do you want outsiders to know the addresses of routers and other devices on your network? After an outsider has the address and knows that a computer is online using that address, it's easy to use one of the many hacker tools available on the Internet to begin breaking into the computer.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

Other IDS Features to Consider

So far you've seen that Stalker and CMDS are complementary system-level IDSs that catch a number of attacks which scanners and network sniffers cannot The next few sections summarize some other important issues to consider about system intrusion detection.

Ease of Set Up

Both Stalker and CMDS are distributed, client-server products. Depending on your network configuration, the installation and setup can be simple or complex. The usual rule of "your mileage may vary" is a good one to keep in mind.

Agent code must be installed on each CMDS target or Stalker agent. Although some autodiscovery is provided, the Server or Manager will need to be made aware of which nodes to monitor. The time it takes to configure nodes is a small constant value in most cases, but you need to multiply this value by the number of nodes you have.

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As with most systems that rely on host names and IP addresses for identification, the use of dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) or regular changes to host identifiers will require additional administration. If you treat all monitored nodes uniformly, administration is simpler. However, if you want to analyze different statistics or attack patterns on each node, your administrative workload also will increase. Any variability in your monitoring requirements per node naturally will drive configuration changes on either agents or servers/ managers.

Distributed Intrusion Detection

Neither Stalker nor CMDS track the activities of a given user across multiple systems unless the assumption is that a person will have the same UID across all systems in the enterprise. Because this assumption is highly unlikely—even though the login name might be the same, the UIDs across systems may not be equivalent—tracking the activities of a single user throughout the enterprise is not straightforward.

One solution would be to add to each audit record, when consolidated on the server, with the originating host IP address. Unfortunately, this solution does not work for systems with multiple network adapters because the node will have several IP addresses. Also, in sites where IP addresses are assigned dynamically with DHCP, relying on an IP address to be meaningful would be a mistake because it could be reassigned at a future time. The host's name would probably be more reliable. When consolidating activities across systems, CMDS relies on the host's name and UID paired together to uniquely identify a user.

Distributed systems management framework vendors, such as Tivoli, are all too aware of this identity problem in networked environments. The favored approach is to assign a framework-specific host identifier that is persistent across changes in IP addresses or other system parameters, such as the planar ROM ID. Assigning a network user name that is independent of the system on which a user operates also would be useful. However, such an extension would require changes in core parts of the OS, such as the login process and the generation of audit records, in order to track user activities across multiple systems. One research project prototyped this approach for intrusion detection across systems (Snapp et al., 1991).

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